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We study the identication of an insurance model with multidimensional screen-
ing, where insurees are characterized by risk and risk aversion. The model is solved
using the concept of certainty equivalence under constant absolute risk aversion and
an unspecied joint distribution of risk and risk aversion. The paper then analyzes
how data availability constraints identication under four data scenarios from the
ideal situation to a more realistic one. The observed number of accidents for each
insuree plays a key role to identify the model.
In a rst part, we consider the case of a continuum of coverages oered to each
insuree whether the damage distribution is fully observed or truncated. Truncation
arises from that an insuree les a claim only when the accident involves a damage
above the deductible. Despite bunching due to multidimensional screening, we show
that the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is identied. In a second part, we
consider the case of a nite number of coverages oered to each insuree. When the
full damage distribution is observed, we show that despite additional pooling due
to the nite number of contracts, the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is
identied under a full support assumption and a conditional independence assump-
tion involving the car characteristics. When the damage distribution is truncated,
the joint distribution is identied up to the probability that the damage is above
the deductible. In a third part, we derive the restrictions imposed by the model on
observables for the fourth scenario. We also propose several identication strate-
gies for the damage probability at the deductible. These identication results are
further exploited in a companion paper developing an estimation method with an
application to insurance data.
Keywords: Nonparametric Identication, Multidimensional Screening, Insurance, Mo-
ment Generating Function.Identication of Insurance Models with
Multidimensional Screening
G. Aryal, I. Perrigne & Q. Vuong
1 Introduction
Identication of structural models in industrial organization has received much attention
over the past fteeen years. See the survey by Athey and Haile (2007) on the nonpara-
metric identication of auction models. The problem of identication in econometrics
has a long history. See Koopmans (1949) and Hurwicz (1950). It is a key step for the
econometric and empirical analysis of structural models. For instance, the labor literature
provides many examples of the role played by identication in empirical studies as dis-
cussed by Heckman (2001). Studies on identication have known a renewed interest due
to the development of nonparametric models with nonseparable error terms (see Matzkin
(1994, 2007)), and to the use of structural models in empirical industrial organization.
The problem of (nonparametric) identication is important for several reasons. First,
it allows to assess the conditions required (if any) to recover uniquely the structure of
the model from the observables while minimizing parametric assumptions. Second, it
highlights which variations in the data allows one to identify each element of the struc-
ture. Third, some important questions related to the structural analysis of models can
be addressed once identication is established. One can think of which distribution of
the data can be rationalized by the model, or what restrictions the model imposes on the
observables that can be used to test the model validity.
More recently, the identication of several models with incomplete information has
1been addressed. Several lessons can be drawn. First, the optimal behavior of economic
agents plays an important role in identifying the model. For instance, in nonlinear pricing
models, the optimality of the tari oered to consumers needs to be considered in addition
to the optimal consumers' behavior to recover the latter's willingness-to-pay distribution
and marginal utilities. See Perrigne and Vuong (2009). In this case, the rst-order
conditions play a crucial role in establishing identication. Second, identication can be
achieved with instrumental variables and exclusion restrictions, which have been widely
used in the early literature on identication. Third, the one-to-one mapping between the
unobserved agent's private information and the observed outcome such as the bidder's
private value and his bid in auctions is a key element on which identication relies. See
Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile (2007) in the context of auctions.
Our paper diers from the previous literature in several dimensions. First, we consider
a model with multidimensional screening in which bunching/pooling cannot be avoided.
In this case, identication cannot rely exclusively on the one-to-one mapping between the
agent's unobserved types and his observed outcome/action.1 Second, we consider a nite
number of options/contracts oered to each agent, while agents' types are distributed
over a continuum. In addition to the bunching arising from multidimensional screening,
additional bunching arises because a nite number of contracts is oered to each agent.
This represents an additional challenge in the study of identication.2
In this paper, we are interested in the identication of insurance models with multidi-
mensional screening. Recent empirical studies on insurance by Cohen and Einav (2007)
and Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2009) have shown an important heterogeneity in
risk preferences, which may counterbalance the traditional intuition behind the Roth-
1Relying on Rochet and Chone (1998), Pioner (2007) addresses the identication of multidimensional
screening models in a nonlinear pricing context but assumes that one of the two agent's types is observed
by the analyst.
2Crawford and Shum (2007) consider two contracts while agents' types can take only two values thereby
avoiding any bunching. Gayle and Miller (2008) adopt a similar strategy. Leslie (2004) entertains a nite
number of price options through a discrete choice model to analyze consumers' behavior but takes the
price schedule as exogenous. On the other hand, Perrigne and Vuong (2008, 2009) and D'Haultfoeuille
and Fevrier (2007) consider a continuum of contracts in principal-agent settings.
2schild and Stiglitz (1977) model of insurance. Namely, a low risk driver may buy a high
coverage because of high risk aversion and conversely. Thus, a model of insurance needs
to incorportate an additional component of asymmetric information, i.e. agent's risk aver-
sion. Multidimensional screening, however, is known to be a dicult theoretical problem
because of the violation of the Spence-Mirrlees (single-crossing) condition. Thus, bunch-
ing will arise. See Rochet and Stole (2003) for a survey. In our case, following Aryal and
Perrigne (2009), this problem is solved using the certainty equivalence for no coverage.
In particular, the latter allows one to separate insurees though each level of certainty
equivalence corresponds to a set of individuals with dierent risk and risk aversion. The
model structure is given by the damage distribution and the joint distribution of risk and
risk aversion. For convenience, we consider constant absolute risk aversion as the latter
leads to an explicit expression for the certainty equivalence.
We proceed as follows. We consider several data scenarios from the ideal case with a
continuum of contracts oered to each insuree and a fully observed damage distribution
to the more realistic case with a nite number of contracts oered to each insuree and
a truncated damage distribution as an insuree les a claim only if the damage is above
the deductible. This allows us to better understand the role played by the data and in
particular how data constraints or limits identication of primitives. Moreover, this allows
us to assess which identifying assumption is needed.
The rst data scenario is in the spirit of the auction literature as we exploit the one-to-
one mapping between the level of certainty equivalence and the deductible to identify the
distribution of certainty equivalence. The repetition of some outcome by the agent, namely
the number of accidents, then plays a crucial role in identifying the joint distribution of risk
and risk aversion. This contrasts with Chiappori and Salanie (2000) test of asymmetric
information in automobile insurance, which relies on whether the insuree has an accident.
When considering heterogeneity in risk aversion, our results show that we need to exploit
the number of accidents to achieve identication. The second data scenario maintains a
continuum of contracts but considers a damage distribution truncated at the deductible.
Because a continuum of contracts is oered, the subpopulation choosing full insurance,
3i.e. a zero deductible, identies the damage distribution and the argument of the rst
case applies.
When considering a nite number of contracts, identication becomes more complex
as the FOCs no longer provide a one-to-one mapping between the contract terms and
the insuree's private information. Though the context is dierent, the number of acci-
dents plays a key role again in identifying the marginal distribution of risk. Regarding
the identication of the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion, we exploit an exclu-
sion restriction and a full support assumption requiring sucient variations in the car
characteristics. Under these assumptions, the structure is identied when the damage
distribution is fully observed. On the other hand, when the damage distribution is trun-
cated at the deductible, we obtain identication of the structure up to the knowledge of
the probability that the damage is below the deductible. The latter probability is not
identied. To complete these results, we derive the model restrictions on the observables
in the fourth data scenario. We also explore some identifying assumptions for the prob-
ability of damage below the deductible. We consider a parameterization of the damage
distribution, additional data and a set identication strategy leading to some bounds for
the model structure.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model with a continuum
of contracts oered to each insuree and an extension to two contracts oered. Section
3 addresses identication when a continuum of contracts is oered whether the damage
distribution is fully observed or truncated at the deductible. Section 4 studies identi-
cation when only two contracts are oered to each insuree making again the distinction
between a fully observed damage distribution and a truncated one. Section 5 derives the
restrictions imposed by the model under the latter data scenario, while Section 6 discusses
some identifying strategies for the damage probability below the deductible. Section 7
concludes.
42 A Model of Insurance
This section relies on the theoretical results of Aryal and Perrigne (2009), who solve the
bidimensional screening problem in insurance. The basic idea is to use the concept of
certainty equivalence to rank insurees and reduce the bidimensional screening problem
into a single dimension. As expected, there is some pooling at equilibrium as agents with
the same level of certainty equivalence when no insurance is bought choose the same pair
of premium and deductible. They show that using certainty equivalence is not suboptimal
for the insurer to screen insurees. They also derive the rst-order conditions that must
satisfy the premium and deductible when a continuum of coverages is oered and when a
nite number of coverages is oered. In this section, we briey review the notations and
results that are needed to study the identication of the model. A notable dierence of
our model with theirs is the denition of risk. In the theoretical literature on insurance
starting with Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglitz (1977), the insuree's risk is dened
as the probability of accident. With such a denition of risk, Aryal, Perrigne and Vuong
(2009) show that the model is not identied even in the best data scenario of a continuum
of contracts and a fully observed damage distribution. Intuitively, one can identify the
distribution of certainty equivalence but the nonavailability of the number of accidents
for each insuree leads to the nonidentication of the joint distribution of risk and risk
aversion. Because we exploit here the observed number of accidents for each insuree, for
convenience we measure the insuree's risk as the expected number of accidents. From an
empirical perspective, this measure makes sense as the insurer cares about the number of
accidents for each insuree as each accident may involve some payment. The theoretical
results of Aryal and Perrigne (2009) extend to this case.
We rst introduce some notations and assumptions. Each insuree is characterized by
a pair (;a), where  is his risk measured as the expected number of accidents and a
is his coecient of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). This information is known
only to the insuree leading to a problem of imperfect information for the insurer. The
latter is assumed to be a monopolist as in Stiglitz (1977). In contrast, in the pioneering
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, insurees vary in risk only, while their risk aversion
5is common and known to the insurer. The pair (;a) is distributed as F(;), which is
twice continuously dierentiable on its support A = [;][a;a]. The pairs (;a) are
assumed to be independent across insurees. The insuree's utility function is assumed to be
CARA, i.e. Ua(x) =  e ax. Each insuree may be involved in J accidents over the contract
period, where J follows a Poisson distribution with parameter . The number of accidents
J is independent across individuals. Each accident involves a damage Dj;j = 1;:::;J,
which are i.i.d as H() with support [0;d]  IR+. Damages are independent of (;a).
Certainty Equivalence
We introduce the concept of certainty equivalence when the individual has no coverage
and when he buys an insurance contract (t;dd), where t is the premium and dd the
deductible. Denoting w the insuree's wealth and pj = Pr[j accidents occur] = e j=j!,
the expected utility of a (;a) insuree without insurance is






























where a = E[eaD1] > 1. The certainty equivalence CE(0;0;;a) of no insurance coverage
is dened by the amount of certain wealth for the insuree that will give him the same
level of utility when he has no coverage, i.e. by  e aCE(0;0;;a) =  e aw+(a 1). Thus,




We can verify that @s=@ < 0 and @s=@a < 0. The certainty equivalence of no insurance
coverage decreases in both risk and risk aversion. As s is a function of (;a), it is random
and distributed as K() on [s;s], where s corresponds to the insuree (;a) and s to the
insuree (;a), respectively. The certainty equivalence of no insurance coverage denes a
locus of pairs (;a) on a downward sloping curve (a) at s given.
6We now turn to the certainty equivalence when the individual buys the insurance
coverage (t;dd). The (;a) insuree's expected utility needs to incorporate that the damage
is covered by the insurer when it is above the deductible. Thus, his utility is aected by
the damage only when it is below the deductible. Using the same derivation as above
where w and Dj are replaced by w   t and min(dd;Dj), respectively, we obtain








0 eaDdH(D) + eadd(1   H(dd)). The
certainty equivalence for purchasing the coverage (t;dd) is given by
CE(t;dd;;a) = w   t  

R dd





We rst assume that the insurer oers a continuum of contracts (t(;a);dd(;a)),












































where max(0;d dd(;a)) reects that the insurer covers the damage above the deductible
only and (t(;a);dd(;a)) indicates the dependence of the premium and deductible on
the insuree's type. The notation pj() emphasizes its dependence on the insuree's risk
. The last equality follows from
P1
j=1 pj()j =  and
R d
0 maxf0;D   dd(;a)gdH(D) =
R d
dd(;a)(1   H(D))dD.
7Following Aryal and Perrigne (2009), we can equivalently express the insurer's ex-
pected prot in terms of the certainty equivalence of no insurance s = CE(0;0;;a). In
particular, the insurer does as well by proposing the same contract (t(s);dd(s)) for all
insurees with (;a) pairs leading to the certainty equivalence s. Thus, t(;a) = t(s) and











where k() is the density of certainty equivalence.
The Optimization Problem
Hereafter, we solve the problem in terms of s. The contracts need to guarantee the
insuree's participation and his true type revelation. For the latter, we have
max
~ s2[s;s]













for all s 2 [s;s], where
(s;a;dd(s)) =
a   1
a(w   s)eadd(s)[1   H(dd(s))]
; (4)
since  = a(w   s)=(a   1). This provides the incentive compatibility constraint for the
insurer's optimization problem. Regarding the individual rationality constraint, Aryal
and Perrigne (2009) show that (i) there is no countervailing incentives problem and (ii)
it reduces to the boundary condition that sets the certainty equivalence for purchasing
coverage CE(t(s);dd(s);;a) for the (;a) insuree at s  CE(0;0;;a).
Aryal and Perrigne (2009) show that the insurer's problem can be solved along the
path a(s), which is determined as the intersection of the insuree's (IC) constraint, i.e.
 =  t0(s)exp( add(s))=[dd0(s)(1   H(dd(s)))] and his certainty equivalence s, i.e.  =
a(w   s)=(a   1). Thus, (4) can be written as (s;a(s);dd(s)). The Hamiltonian of the














where t(s) and dd(s) are the state variables, t0(s) and dd0(s) are the control variables, v(s),





















where 0(s;a(s);dd(s)) denotes the total derivative of (s;a(s);dd(s)) with respect to s,
with the initial condition CE(t(dd(s));dd(s);s) = s. See Aryal and Perrigne (2009) for
the derivation of (5) and (6) interpreting their  as the expected number of accidents.
At equilibrium, a lower value of s implies more insurance, i.e. a lower deductible and a
higher premium. At s, we have full insurance with dd(s) = 0.
Finite Number of Contracts
In practice, the principal oers a nite number C of contracts from which the agent can
choose. In insurance, we observe in general two to ve pairs of premium and deductible
oered. To simplify the presentation, we consider C = 2. Our model takes C as exogenous.
Let (t1;dd1) and (t2;dd2) with t1 < t2 and dd1 > dd2 be the two contracts oered by the
insurer. We show how the insurer can determine these two contracts optimally. Intuitively,
in addition to the pooling of pairs (;a) leading to the same certainty equivalence s, there
will be bunching of agents with dierent values of s. The idea is then to determine two
subsets A1 and A2 that partition A such that individuals in A1 and A2 choose (t1;dd1)
and (t2;dd2), respectively.
The frontier between A1 and A2 is determined by the locus of (;a) insurees who are
indierent between the two contracts, i.e. for which CE(t1;dd1;;a) = CE(t2;dd2;;a).
9Using the previous expressions for certainty equivalence, the frontier is the part lying in




0 eaDdH(D) + eadd1(1   H(dd1))  
R dd2





dd2 eaD(1   H(D))dD
; (7)
using integration by parts. We denote by  and a the highest risk and risk aversion on
this frontier.

























where the second equality follows from
R
Ac dF(;a) = cE[jAc] with c =
R
Ac dF(;a).
The insurer's expected prot from selling the two coverages is a weighted average with
weights 1 and 2 for the proportion of insurees choosing the rst and second contracts,
respectively.
The optimal contracts need also to satisfy insurees' incentive compatibility and par-
ticipation constraints:
CE(tc;ddc;;a) > CE(tc0;ddc0;;a);c 6= c
0; 8(;a) 2 Ac;c = 1;2;
CE(tc;ddc;;a)  CE(0;0;;a); 8(;a) 2 Ac;c = 1;2:
Following Aryal and Perrigne (2009), the only constraint that binds is the individual
rationality constraint for the (;a) insuree, i.e. CE(t1;dd1;;a) = s. Maximizing E[]





















































































































where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the participation constraint. See
Aryal and Perrigne (2009) for the derivation of (8){(12) reinterpreting their  as the
expected number of accidents.
3 Identication with a Continuum of Contracts
In this section, we consider the case in which a continuum of coverages is oered to each
insuree. Though this is seldom the case in practice, this allows us to understand the
problem of identication and the role played by the assumptions in identifying the model
structure. The model structure is given by the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion
F(;) and the damage distribution H() given that the insuree's utility function is specied
as CARA. Besides the specication of this utility function, the identication problem
is nonparametric.3 The problem of identication is to recover uniquely the structure
3The problem of identifying nonparametrically the agent's utility function is quite complex. In the
context of auctions, the bidder's utility function is not identied in general. Nonparametric identication
is achieved with the help of exclusion restrictions using exogenous variations in the number of bidders
11[F(;);H()] from the observables. In the case of a continuum of contracts, we observe
the contract purchased by each insuree (t;dd) and the J claims made by each insuree
with the corresponding amounts of damages (D1;:::;DJ). In Section 3.2, we observe J
claims with their corresponding damages (D1;:::;DJ) because of the truncation at the
deductible.
We introduce some observed variables characterizing the insuree. We distinguish two
kinds of variables. The variables related to the insuree's personal information such as
age, gender, education, marital status, location and driving experience are denoted by
X, while the variables related to the insuree's car such as the car mileage, business use,
car value, power, model and make are denoted by Z.4 We remark that only X is an
exogenous variable as Z can be viewed as endogenously determined in a model including
the insuree's car choice, where Z becomes a funtion of (;a;X). In this section, we allow
(;a) and (X;Z) to be dependent thereby allowing Z to be endogenous.
With the introduction of (X;Z) with values in the support SXZ  IR
dimX+dimZ, the
model structure becomes F(;ajX;Z) and H(DjX;Z) as we expect that both variables
aect the insuree's risk and risk aversion and the damage. For instance, the amount of
damage with an expensive car is likely to be larger than the damage with an inexpensive
one. This intuition is supported by the empirical analysis of Cohen and Einav (2007)
relying on some functional form for F(;ajX;Z). Let G(jX;Z) denote the observed
deductible distribution conditional on (X;Z). It is crucial that all the variables used by
as in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) or with the help of additional data from ascending auction
as in Lu and Perrigne (2008). See also Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) for semiparametric
identication when the bidder's utility function is parameterized as CARA or CRRA. In the context
of insurance with bidimensional screning, it is likely that the insurer's utility function is not identied.
Moreover, the CARA specication simplies considerably the derivation of the model through an explicit
form of the certainty equivalence.
4The value of the car is used as a proxy for wealth w when computing the certainty equivalence so
that w is a variable in Z. Given that only the value of the car is at risk in the case of an accident, we
can consider that the relevant wealth in the model is the value of the car. Cohen and Einav (2007) use
a dierent proxy for wealth obtained from additional census data on average income. This measure of
wealth is then incorporated in the vector X in their empirical analysis.
12the insurer to discriminate insurees are included in (X;Z).
In studies on identication of structural models, it is important to be precise about the
set of admissible structures and the assumptions of the theoretical model. We formalize
such assumptions made on the structure and (;a;J;D;X;Z). Specically, the structure
[F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)] belongs to FXZ  HXZ as dened below.
Denition 1:Let FXZ be the set of conditional distributions F(;jX;Z) satisfying
(i) For every (x;z) 2 SXZ, F(;jx;z) is a c.d.f. with compact support (x;z)A(x;z) =





(ii) The conditional density f(;j;) > 0 on its support.
Denition 2:Let HXZ be the set of distributions H(jX;Z) satisfying
(i) For every (x;z) 2 SXZ, H(jx;z) is a c.d.f with compact support [0;d(x;z)]  IR+ with
sup(x;z)2SXZ d(x;z) < +1,
(ii) The conditional density h(j;) > 0 on its support.
Assumption 1: We have
(i) (D1;:::;DJ) ? (;a)j(J;X;Z).
(ii) (D1;:::;DJ)j(J;X;Z) are i.i.d. as H(jX;Z),
(iii) J ? (X;Z;a)j with Jj  P(), i.e. Pr[J = j] = e  j
j!.
Assumption 1-(i) says that conditional on the insuree's characteristics (X;Z), the amount
of damage does not provide any information on his risk and risk aversion. For instance,
conditional on (X;Z), the damage depends on factors such as road and weather conditions,
bad luck which are independent of (;a). In the same spirit, Assumption 1-(ii) says
that damages are independent conditional on (X;Z). Regarding Assumption 1-(iii), the
number of accidents J depends on the insuree's risk  only, while the Poisson distribution
follows the theoretical model of Section 2, where the insuree's risk  is the expected
number of accidents. We maintain Assumption 1 throughout the paper. In addition,
(;a;J;X;Z) is i.i.d. across insurees.
133.1 Case 1: Full Damage Distribution
Case 1 considers the best data scenario. In addition to a continuum of coverages oered
to each insuree, the damage is observed for every accident whether its amount is below
or above the deductible. It follows that H(jX;Z) is identied on [0;d(X;Z)]. It remains
to study the identication of F(;jX;Z). For the rest of Section 3, to simplify the
notations, we suppress the conditioning on (X;Z). We rst proceed by studying the
identication of the distribution K() of certainty equivalence of no coverage in view of
Section 2. If one can identify K(), there is some hope to identify F(;). The optimal
contracts are characterized by (5) and (6). Equation (5) denes a one-to-one mapping
between the certainty equivalence s and the deductible dd, while (6) denes a one-to-one
mapping between dd and t. The key idea is to exploit the former mapping to identify
the distribution of certainty equivalence from the observed deductible distribution G().
This result is in the spirit of the nonparametric identication literature on auctions and
contracts.5 We have G(dd) = Pr( ~ dd  dd) = Pr(~ s  s(dd)) = K(s) implying g(dd) =
































From (6), we have t0
+(dd) =  1=(s;a(s);dd(s)), where t+(dd) = t[s(dd)]. We also have
dt0
+(dd(s))=ds =  d[(s;a(s);dd(s))] 1=ds, i.e. t00
+(dd)  dd0(s) = 0(s;a(s);dd(s))=[(s;
5For auctions, see Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and the survey by Athey and Haile (2007)
where the mapping between the observed bid and the unobserved private value is exploited to identify
the private value distribution. For contracts, see Perrigne and Vuong (2009) in the context of nonlinear
pricing, and Perrigne and Vuong (2008) in the context of a procurement model with adverse selection
and moral hazard. There, the mapping between the observed price or quantity and the unobserved rm's
type or eciency is exploited to recover the underlying distribution of rms' eciency and willingness to
pay, respectively. See also D'Haultfoeuille and Fevrier (2007).
14a(s);dd(s))]2 or equivalently t00
+(dd) = [0(s;a(s);dd(s))=[(s;a(s);dd(s))]2]s0(dd): Using
this result, we can rewrite the previous equation as


























Thus, the rst-order condition dening the optimal deductible can be rewritten as



















where E(js) = E(jdd) because of the one-to-one mapping between dd and s. After





















showing that a(s) is identied as the right-hand side is observed or identied from ob-
servables. In particular, E(jdd) is identied by the expected number of claims made by
insurees choosing the deductible dd given that all the claims including those below the
deductible are observed by assumption, i.e. E(jdd) = E(Jjdd).6 But, using (4) we have




showing that s is identied from the knowledge of dd. Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 1: Suppose that a continuum of insurance coverages is oered to each insuree
and all accidents are observed for each insuree. Under Assumption 1, the pair (K();H())
is identied.
It remains to investigate whether we can identify F(;) from the knowledge of K().
A sketch of the argument is as follows, where the observed number of claims J plays a
6We have E[Jjdd] = E[Jjs] = EfE[Jj;s]jsg = EfE[Jj;a]jsg = EfE[Jj]jsg = E[js], where we have
used Assumption 1-(iii) and the one-to-one mapping between (;a) and (;s).
15crucial role in identifying F(;).7 Specically, from the moment generating function of
the number of accidents J conditional on s, we show that we can identify the moment
generating function of  given s in a neighborhood of zero. As is well known, the latter
identies FjS(j). Once we identify FjS(j), we use K() to derive the joint distribution
of (;s). Identication of the joint density of (;a) follows from the known one-to-one
mapping between (;s) and (;a) given by (1).
Formally, for a given certainty equivalence s, the subpopulation of insurees with insur-
ance coverage (t(s);dd(s)) and their corresponding claims gives the moment generating
function MJjS(js) as
MJjS(tjs) = E[e





















t   1js); (13)
where the third equality follows from the one-to-one mapping between (;s) and (;a)
and the fourth and fth equalities from Assumption 1-(iii) using the moment generating
function of the Poisson distribution with parameter . In particular, the above equation
shows that the moment generating function MJjS(js) exists for every t 2 IR because 
has a compact support given S = s. Moreover, letting u = et   1 shows that
MjS(ujs) = MJjS(log(1 + u)js)
for all u 2 ( 1;+1). Thus MjS(js) is identied on a neighborhood of 0 thereby identi-
fying FjS(js). See (say) Billingsley (1995, p. 390).8
The joint density of (;s) is f(;s) = f(js)k(s), which is identied. From the known
one-to-one mapping T(;) that transforms (;a) into (;s), namely T(;a) = [;w  
7In contrast, if the analyst observes only whether J = 0 or J  1 with the risk measured by the
probability of some accident(s) ~  = 1   e , F(;) is not identied as shown by Aryal, Perrigne and
Vuong (2009).
8Alternatively, because MjS(js) exists in a neighborhood of 0, then all the monents of  given S = s
are identied by M
(k)
jS(0js) = E[kjS = s] for k = 0;1:::. Since  given s has compact support, we are in
the class of Hausdor moment problems, which are always determinate, i.e. the distribution of  given s
is uniquely determined by its moments.
16[(a 1)]=a]0 with a =
R














This result is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that a continuum of insurance coverages is oered to each in-
suree and all accidents are observed for each insuree. Under Assumption 1, the structure
(F(;);H()) is identied.
3.2 Case 2: Truncated Damage Distribution
We maintain the assumption that the insurer oers a continuum of contracts to each
insuree but we now consider that the damage distribution is not fully observed. In practice
and making abstraction of dynamic considerations, an accident leads to a claim if and only
if the damage is above the deductible. Using the claim data only, we cannot identify the
damage distribution but only the truncated damage distribution on [dd;d]. Nonetheless,
the damage distribution is still identied on its support [0;d] by exploiting claim data for
insurees buying full insurance for whom the deductible is zero. For this coverage, every
accident is reported since dd = 0 and thus H() is identied. Specically, HDjdd(j0) =
HDjS(js) = HDj(;a)(j;a) = HD() by Assumption 1-(i). Thus, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 2: Under Assumption 1, H() is identied.
It remains to study the identication of F(;). Though the reported number of ac-
cidents J is observed instead of J, the argument is similar to Case 1. Specically,
reviewing the argument leading to Lemma 1, it is straightforward to see that K() is
identied if E(jdd) is. Since accidents are reported only if the damage is above the
deductible, we have E[jdd] 6= E[Jjdd], where J is the number of reported accidents,
i.e. those with a damage above the deductible. But J given (J;dd) is distributed as
a Binomial with parameters (J;1   H(dd)) by Assumption 1-(i,ii). Thus, E[Jjdd] =
17EfE[JjJ;dd]jddg = E[J(1 H(dd))jdd] = (1 H(dd))E[Jjdd] = (1 H(dd))E(jdd), i.e.
E[jdd] = E[Jjdd]=(1 H(dd)). Hence, E[jdd] is identied despite the truncation of the
damage distribution at dd leading to the identication of K().
Turning to the identication of F(;a), we begin with the identication of FjS(j) as
before. The moment generating function of J given s is
MJjS(tjs) = E[e
JtjS = s] = EfE[e


















= MjS[(1   H(dd))(e
t   1)js] (14)
where the fourth equality uses the moment generating function of the Binomial distribu-
tion B(J;1   H(dd)) and the fth equality uses (13) with t replaced by log[H(dd) + (1  












for u 2 ( (1   H(dd);+1). The rest of the argument in Case 1 applies leading to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose that a continuum of insurance coverages is oered to each insuree
and accidents are observed if and only if the damage is above the deductible. Under
Assumption 1, the structure (F(;);H()) is identied.
4 Identication with a Finite Number of Contracts
We now address identication of the model when only (say) two contracts are oered
given (X;Z). The identication argument can no longer rely on the identication of the
density of certainty equivalence as we cannot exploit the one-to-one mapping between
the insuree's certainty equivalence and his deductible choice. There is a continuum of
s 2 [s;s] values, while there are only a nite number of deductibles. Consequently, the
FOCs characterizing (t1;dd1;t2;dd2) alone will not allow us to identify F(;a). In addition
to the key role played by the observed number of claims, we exploit sucient variations
18in exogenous variables to achieve identication. In particular, the optimality of contracts
is used through the contract form and the screening procedure. As before, we distinguish
whether the full damage or truncated damage distribution is observed.
4.1 Case 3: Full Damage Distribution
This case is the closest to Cohen and Einav (2007) who consider that claim data contain
all the accidents. Cohen and Einav (2007) identify the joint distribution of risk and
risk aversion under parametric assumptions. In particular, they assume a lognormal
mixture of Poisson for the claim data. Moreover, they do not exploit any information
provided by the optimality of contracts. In this section, we show how some features of
contract optimality combined with a full support assumption with sucient variations in
the car characteristics can be exploited to identiy nonparametrically f(;a). In view
of Cohen and Einav (2007) empirical ndings, our identication result is important for
several reasons. First, the nonparametric identication of the joint distribution of risk
and risk aversion oers more exibility on the dependence between risk and risk aversion.
Their empirical ndings display a counterintuitive positive correlation between the latter
while one could expect a negative one. Second, their robustness analysis suggests that
the oered contracts are suboptimal with their estimated negative correlation, i.e. the
insurer could increase his prot by adjusting upward the current low deductibles. On the
other hand, a positive correlation would imply lower levels of deductibles.
Our identication results rely on a nonparametric mixture of Poisson distribution for
the number of claims. Specically, the probability of the observed claims J conditional
on some characteristics (x;z) is given by







where the mixing distribution FjX;Z(jx;z) is left unspecied.
Given that all the accidents and their corresponding damages are observed, the damage
distribution H(jX;Z) is identied. To establish identication of F(;ajX;Z), we proceed
as follows. We rst show the identication of the marginal distribution of  given (X;Z)
19following an argument similar to Case 1. In a second step, we identify the conditional
distribution of a given (;X;Z) at a(;X;Z), which denes the frontier between the two
sets A1(X;Z) and A2(X;Z). In a third step, we make an exclusion restriction and a
full support assumption involving the car characteristics Z to achieve identication of the
distribution of a given (;X;Z) on its support.
For the rst step, we exploit again the observed number of accidents. Using an argu-
ment similar to that leading to (13) for the subpopulation of insurees with characteristics
(x;z), the moment generating function MJjX;Z(jx;z) is
MJjX;Z(tjx;z) = E[e
JtjX = x;Z = z] = E
n
E[e














where the third and fourth equalities follow from Assumption 1-(iv). Thus, fjX;Z(j;) is
identied by its moment generating function
MjX;Z(ujx;z) = MJjX;Z(log(1 + u)jx;z)
for all u 2 ( 1;+1).
In the second step, we consider the probability that an insuree with risk  and
characteristics (X;Z) chooses the coverage (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z)) as intuitively this pro-
vides information about the insuree's risk aversion a. To do so, we dene the dis-
crete variable , which takes the values 1 and 2 whether the insuree chooses the cov-
erage (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z)) or (t2(X;Z);dd2(X;Z)), i.e. whether the insuree's types
(;a) belongs to A1(X;Z) or A2(X;Z), respectively. Thus,  = 1 is also equivalent
to a  a(;X;Z), where the latter is the inverse of the frontier (7), where (t1;dd1;t2;dd2)
and H() now depends on (X;Z). We remark that some features of optimal contracts are
used here, namely the oered contracts are of the form premium/deductible, while the
(;a) space is partitioned optimally by the frontier (7). The above probability of interest





20by Bayes rule, where 1(x;z) is the proportion of insurees with characteristics (x;z)
choosing the coverage (t1(x;z);dd1(x;z)). The latter is identied from the data. Since
fjX;Z(j;) is identied from the rst step, it remains to identify fj;X;Z(j1;x;z). Ap-






where the second equality follows from that conditioning on (;a;) is equivalent to
conditioning on (;a), while the third equality follows as before from Assumption 1-(iv).
Thus, fj;X;Z(j1;;) is identied by its moment generating function
Mj;X;Z(uj1;x;z) = MJj;X;Z(log(1 + u)j1;x;z)
for all u 2 ( 1;+1).9 Hence, Faj;X;Z[a(;x;z)j;x;z] is identied for every  2 [(x;z);
(x;z)] and (x;z) 2 SXZ.
To conduct policy counterfactuals, however, the analyst may need to identify F(;jx;z)
on the whole support (x;z)  A(x;z). This is the purpose of the third step. To do so,
we make the following assumptions. Let SW denote the support of some variable W and
SW1jw2 denote the support of some variable W1 given some variable W2 = w2.
Assumption 2: We have
(i) a ? Zj(;X)
(ii) 8(;a;x) 2 SaX, there exists z 2 SZjx such that a(;x;z) = a.
Assumption 2-(i) is an exclusion restriction that gives
Faj;X;Z(a(;x;z)j;x;z) = Faj;X(a(;x;z)j;x) 8(;x;z):
Because the left-hand side is identied from the second step, sucient variations in
a(;x;z) due to z can identify Faj;X(j;x). This is the purpose of Assumption 2-(ii),
which is a full support assumption. Similar assumptions (sometimes called large support
9The argument works as well by considering  = 2 leading to the overidentication of
Faj;X;Z[a(;x;z)j;x;z]. This issue will be further discussed in Section 5.
21assumptions) have been made by dierent authors in various contexts. See Matzkin (1992,
1993), Lewbel (2000), Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003), Berry and Haile (2009) and
Imbens and Newey (2009) among others. In our context, this assumption can be inter-
preted as follows: For every individual with personal characteristics (;a;X), there exists
some (say) car characteristics Z for which the insuree is indierent between the two of-
fered coverages. The full support assumption is sucient to guarantee identication as
shown next but it is not necessary.10 Specically, we have
Faj;X(aj;x) = Faj;X[a(;x;z)j;x] = Faj;X;Z[a(;x;z)j;x;z];
where the rst equality uses the full support assumption and the second equality uses the
exclusion restriction assumption. Note that a(;;) is identied in view of (7). Identica-
tion of F(;ajx;z) follows using the rst step. This result is formally stated in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose that two insurance coverages are oered to each insuree and
all accidents are observed for each insuree. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the structure
(F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)) is identied.
4.2 Case 4: Truncated Damage Distribution
The data scenario analyzed in Case 4 corresponds to the insurance data that a researcher
typically has, i.e. a nite number of contracts oered with claims led only if damages
are above the deductible. Case 3 has shown that observing a nite number of contracts
does not prevent the nonparametric identication of the joint distribution of risk and risk
aversion provided all accident information is available and there is enough variation in
some excluded exogenous variables. In contrasts, the truncation on the damage distribu-
tion in Case 4 will limit the extent of identication. Nevertheless, we show that F(;) is
10In other words, it may not be the minimal assumption required to identify F(;ajx;z). For instance,
we could have switched the roles of X and Z in Assumption 2. We prefer to use Z because it contains
the car value, which is continuous as required by the full support assumption.
22identied up to the knowledge of H(dd2(X;Z)jX;Z) or equivalently H(dd1(X;Z)jX;Z),
where dd1(X;Z) > dd2(X;Z).11
We follow similar steps as in Case 3 with ~   (1   H(dd2(X;Z)jX;Z)) replacing 
while modifying the argument as J is unobserved. To begin, we note the relationship
between 1   H(dd1(X;Z)jX;Z) and 1   H(dd2(X;Z)jX;Z) which allows us to focus on
identication only in terms of 1   H(dd2(X;Z)jX;Z). Because a claim is led only if it







on [ddc(X;Z);d(X;Z)] from the subpopulation of insurees buying the coverage (tc(X;Z);
ddc(X;Z)) for c = 1;2. To simplify the notations, we let Hc(X;Z) = H(ddc(X;Z)jX;Z)










for all D  dd1(X;Z), where 0 < (X;Z) < 1. In particular, the function (;) is
identied from the data, while H(jX;Z) is identied on [dd2(X;Z);d(X;Z)] up to the
knowledge of H2(X;Z).
To identify the marginal density ~ f~ jXZ(j;) of ~  given (X;Z), we exploit the observed
number of reported accidents J
c. Using a similar argument as in (14), the moment
generating function of J given (;X;Z) is
MJj;X;Z(tjc;x;z) = E[e
Jtj = c;X = x;Z = z]
= EfE[e
JtjJ;;X;Z]j = c;X = x;Z = zg
= E
n
[H(X;Z) + (1   H(X;Z))e
t]










[H(X;Z)+(1 H(X;Z))et 1]j = c;X = x;Z = z
i
= Mj;X;Z[(1   H(X;Z))(e
t   1)jc;x;z] (16)
11When two contracts are oered, it is never optimal for the insurer to oer full insurance, i.e.
dd2(X;Z) = 0. Therefore, we cannot use the argument of Case 2 to identify H(jX;Z) and hence
H2(jX;Z).
23where the third equality uses the moment generating function of J given ;X;Z, which is
distributed as a Binomial B(J;1 H(X;Z)) by Assumption 1-(ii,iii), and the fth equal-
ity follows from Assumption 1-(iv) and the moment generating function of the Poisson












for u 2 ( (1   H(X;Z);+1). In particular, the distribution of risk  given (;X;Z)
is identied up to the knowledge of H(X;Z). Since ~  = (1   H2(X;Z)), its moment
generating function given (;X;Z) is














if c = 1;
MJj;X;Z [log(1 + u)j2;x;z] if c = 2;
(18)
for all u 2 ( (x;z);+1) and u 2 ( 1;+1), respectively. Thus, the moment generating
function of ~  given (X;Z) is
M~ jX;Z(ujx;z) = EfE[e












+ MJj;X;Z [log(1+u)j2;x;z]2(x;z); (19)
for u 2 ( (x;z);+1), showing that ~ f~ jX;Z(j;) is identied as (X;Z), 1(X;Z) and
2(X;Z) are known from the data. Since fjX;Z(jx;z) = (1   H2(x;z)) ~ f~ jX;Z((1  
H2(x;z))jX;Z), the former density is identied up to H2(x;z).
In the second step, we consider again the probability that an insuree with risk 
and characteristics (X;Z) chooses the coverage (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z)). Using (7) and 1  
H(DjX;Z) = (1   H2(X;Z))(1   H
2(DjX;Z)), we remark that the optimal frontier




dd2(X;Z) eaD[1   H
2(DjX;Z)]dD
; (20)
24leading to the inverse ~ a(~ ;X;Z), which is identied. As before, from Bayes rule we have
Faj~ ;X;Z(~ a(~ ;x;z)j~ ;x;z) =
~ f~ j;X;Z(~ j1;x;z)1(x;z)
~ f~ jX;Z(~ jx;z)
; (21)
where 1(x;z) and ~ f~ jX;Z(~ jx;z) are identied. Moreover, ~ f~ j;X;Z(j1;x;z) is identied
because its moment generating function M~ j;X;Z(j1;x;z) is identied on ( (x;z);+1)
as seen above.
In the third step, we note that Faj~ ;X;Z(~ a(~ ;x;z)j~ ;x;z) = Faj;X;Z(a(;x;z)j;x;z)
thereby identifying the latter up to H2(x;z). The rest of the argument is exactly the same
as in Case 3 leading to the identication of Faj;X(j;) and then the joint distribution
of (;a) given (X;Z) up to the knowledge of H2(X;Z) because a(;;) is known up to
H2(;). We have then proved the following result.
Proposition 4: Suppose that two insurance coverages are oered to each insuree and
accidents are observed only when damages are above the deductible. Under Assumptions
1 and 2, the structure (F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)) is identied up to H2(X;Z).
Up to now, we have used little of the optimality of the oered coverages beyond the
contract form and the screening through the optimal frontier partitioning the insurees'
types. For instance, we have not used the FOC (8){(12) determining the optimal insurance
terms (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z);t2(X;Z);dd2(X;Z)). One might ask whether the use of these
FOC may help in identifying some features of the structure or even the full structure itself.















using h(DjX;Z) = [1 H2(X;Z)]h
2(DjX;Z) and ~ (X;Z) = (X;Z)[1 H2(X;Z)]. Other
features of the structure may be identied.
A consequence of Proposition 4 is that the structure [F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)] is iden-
tied if and only if H2(X;Z) is identied. The next lemma shows that H2(X;Z) is
25not identied even when considering the full optimality of the model including the FOC
(8)-(12).12
Lemma 3: Suppose that two insurance coverages are oered to each insuree and accidents
are observed only when damages are above the deductible. Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
H2(X;Z) is not identied.
The proof can be found in the appendix. It relies on the construction of an obser-
vationally equivalent structure leading to the same observations. The nonidentication
arises from a compensation between the increase in the number of accidents and an appro-
priate decrease in the probability of damages being greater than the deductible. From the
insuree's perspective, such a compensation maintains the relative ranking between the two
contracts. Thus, if a (;a) insuree buys (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z)) then the ((1 H2(X;Z));a)
insuree also buys the same coverage if there is an appropriate increase (decrease) in the
probability of damages being greater than dd1(X;Z) thereby increasing (decreasing) the
likelihood of getting indemnity from the insurer. For the insurer's perspective, the de-
crease (increase) in the average number of accidents is compensated by an appropriate
decrease (increase) in the probability that the damage is below the deductible. Thus the
expected payment to the insuree remains the same under either coverage.
5 Model Restrictions
This section derives the restrictions imposed by the model on observables under the data
scenario of Case 4, i.e. a nite number of contracts and a truncated damage distribution.




j denotes the (truncated) damage for the jth
reported accident and (T;DD) are the premium and deductible chosen by the insuree.
From the model, T and DD are given by T = t(X;Z) aand DD = dd(X;Z), where
12In particular, the observed optimal proportion of insurees 2(X;Z) does not help in
identifying H2(X;Z). Specically, 2(X;Z) =
R
1 I[  (a;X;Z)]f(;a)dda = 1  
R
Faj;X;Z[a(;X;Z)j;X;Z]fjX;Z(jX;Z)d = 1   1(X;Z), which is always true.
26tc(X;Z) and ddc(X;Z) for c = 1;2 are deterministic functions of (X;Z) satisfying the
rst-order conditions (8)-(12). Thus, the vector of observables has a joint distribution
	(;:::;) with a density  (;:::;) =  D
1;:::;D
JjJ;;X;Z(;:::;j;:::;) Jj;X;Z(j;)
 jX;Z(j;)   X;Z(;).
The next lemma provides necessary and sucient conditions on the joint distribution
	(;:::;) to be rationalized by a structure [F(;j;);H(j;)] 2 FXZ  HXZ. We in-
troduce some notations. Let H
cXZ be dened as the set HXZ with the dierence that
the support is [ddc(X;Z);d(X;Z)] for c = 1;2. The remaining notations are introduced
to write the model restrictions implied by the full support assumption and the rst-
order conditions (8){(12) (see conditions (iv) and (v) below). The insurer's expected
payment in case of accident given the coverage c and characteristics (x;z) is denoted
E[Pjc;x;z] =
R d(x;z)
ddc(x;z)(1   	Dj;X;Z(Djc;x;z))dD for c = 1;2. We dene ~ (a)  ~ (a;x;z)
and ~ a()  ~  1(~ ;x;z) as in (20) with H
2(DjX;Z) replaced by 	Dj;X;Z(Dj2;X;Z).
Let ~ f~ j;X;Z(j;;) and ~ f~ jX;Z(j;) be densities corresponding to the moment generating
functions (18) and (19), respectively with c(x;z) replaced by  jX;Z(cjx;z) for c = 1;2
and (x;z) =  Dj;X;Z(j2;x;z)= Dj;X;Z(j1;x;z). We denote by ~  = ~ (x;z) the lower
bound of the support of ~ f~ jX;Z(j;). Let ~ f(;j;) = ~ faj~ ;X;Z(j;;) ~ f~ jX;Z(j;), where
~ faj~ ;X;Z(j;;) is obtained from (21) and Assumption 2. Let [a;a]  [a(x;z);a(x;z)] be
the support of ~ fajX;Z(jx;z), while a  a(x;z) = minfa;~ a(~ ;x;z)g. Lastly, we dene




















which expresses the Lagrange multiplier in terms of observables.
Lemma 4 (Rationalization Lemma): Let 	(;:::;) be the distribution of (J;D
1;:::;
D
J; ;X;Z). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, [F(;j;);H(j;)] 2 FXZHXZ rationalizes










27(ii) For all (x;z) 2 SXZ,  Dj;X;Z(j2;x;z) and  Dj;X;Z(j1;x;z) are strictly positive
on [dd2(x;z);d(x;z)] and [dd1(x;z);d(x;z)], respectively. Moreover, their ratio (x;z) is
independent of d 2 [dd1(x;z);d(x;z)] with 0 < (x;z) < 1,
(iii) For c = 1;2 and all (x;z) 2 SXZ,  Jj;X;Z(jc;x;z) > 0 on I N with a moment gener-
ating function dened on IR such that the right-hand sides of (18) are the moment gen-
erating functions of absolutely continuous distributions with densities bounded away from
zero on their supports [~ (1;x;z);~ (1;x;z)] and [~ (2;x;z);~ (2;x;z)] with union equal to
[~ (1;x;z);~ (2;x;z)] included in IR++.13 Moreover, Saj~ x  fa : 9z 2 SZj~ x;a = ~ a(~ ;x;z)g
is a compact interval in IR++ independent of ~ ,




~ f~ j;X;Z[~ j1;x;z] jX;Z(1jx;z)
~ f~ jX;Z(~ jx;z)




(v) The coverage terms t1(;);t2(;); dd1(;);dd2(;) satisfy 0  t1(;) < t2(;); d(;) 






























da +  jX;Z(2jx;z)
13Alternatively, the conditions on the moment generating function of J given (;X;Z) in (iii) can be
replaced by conditions on its characteristic function Jj;X;Z(jc;x;z). Specically, Jj;X;Z(jc;x;z) is
an entire characteristic function such that the right-hand sides of (29)-(30) are characteristic functions
corresponding to absolutely continuous distributions with densities bounded away from zero on their
supports [~ (1;x;z);~ (1;x;z)] and [~ (2;x;z);~ (2;x;z)] with union equal to [~ (1;x;z);~ (2;x;z)] included
in I R++. Such conditions can be written equivalently in more testable forms. For instance, a function is
a characteristic function if and only if it satises Bochner's Theorem 4.2.2, and it is entire if and only if
it satises Theorem 7.2.1. A characteristic function corresponds to a distribution with bounded support
in I R++ if and only if it satises Theorem 7.2.3 with (7.2.3) strictly positive. All these theorems and
equations are from Lukacs (1960). A well-known sucient condition for a distribution to be absolutely
continuous is that its characteristic function is absolutely integrable, while a necessary condition is that












































Condition (i) says that reported damages are independent and identically distributed
given the coverage choice and individual/car characteristics. In addition, reported dam-
ages are independent of the reported number of accidents given those variables. This is a
consequence of Assumption 1-(i,ii) on damages and number of accidents. Condition (ii)
requires that the densities of reported damages given coverage choice and individual/car
characteristics are strictly positive on their supports. More importantly, the ratio of these
densities needs to be independent of the level of reported damage above the level of high-
est deductible following (15). This property is also a consequence of Assumption 1-(i,ii),
i.e. independently and identically distributed damages and independence of damages from
coverage choice. Condition (iii) states that the support of the distribution of reported
accidents given coverage choice and individual/car characteristics is the set of integers.
The remaining part of (iii) follows from the compact support of the joint distribution of
risk and risk aversion and its nonvanishing corresponding density by Denition 1. In view
of (21), condition (iv) says that the probability for choosing coverage 1 by an insuree
characterized by (;x;z) takes all values in [0;1] as the car characteristics vary. This
follows from the full support assumption in Assumption 2. Condition (v) provides the
relationship between the distribution of observables and the coverage terms. In particu-
lar, it requires that the premium and deductible for the two coverages must satisfy the
optimality conditions, i.e. the rst-order conditions (8)-(12).
The rationalization lemma is important for several reasons. First, the insurance model
with multidimensional private information does impose some restrictions on observables.
In view of bunching in our model due to multidimensional screening and a nite number
29of coverages, one could have expected otherwise a priori. For instance, in auction mod-
els, the main restriction arises from the monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy,
which is not present here because of the nite number of contracts. Second, Lemma 4
characterizes all the restrictions on the distribution of observables. It can be used to
test the validity of the model. Violation of a single restriction by the data would reject
the model. Relying on some recent developments in the econometrics literature, we can
discuss some testing procedures for each condition. For instance, (i) can be implemented
using conditional independence tests. See Su and White (2008). The independence of
(x;z) from damage can be tested by noting that the ratio of the densities is also equal
to the ratio 	Dj;X;Z(dd1(x;z)j2;x;z)=	Dj;X;Z(dd1(x;z)j1;x;z). This equality can then
be used to derive a Cramer-Von Mises type test relying on nonparametric estimates of the
densities. See Brown and Wegkamp (2002). Regarding (iii), as noted in footnote 12, we
can equivalently derive the restrictions that must satisfy the corresponding characteristic
function because the moment generating function at u is equal to the characteristic func-
tion at  iu. See Lukacs (1960, p. 135). Such restrictions would be then more convenient
to derive appropriate tests of such conditions.
Third, (v) provides restrictions on the coverage terms suggesting that an optimality
test could be performed. This contrasts with the previous structural literature in which
it is generally assumed that the observations are the outcomes of some equilibrium. In
particular, in auctions, observed bids result from the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
auction game and identication relies on such optimal behavior. This represents a strong
assumption that might be questionable from an empirical point of view. In contrast,
when the number of contracts is nite, optimality of the coverage terms given by (8){
(12) is not used in identifying the model structure. As noted earlier, we exploit only the
optimal partitioning of insurees among the two contracts taking the observed premiums
and deductibles as given leading to the restrictions (i){(iv). Thus, (22){(25) can be used
to test the optimality of the observed coverages (T1;DD1;T2;DD2).14
14Though we use a dierent identication strategy for a continuum of contracts relying on the mono-
tonicity of the coverage terms in the certainty equivalence, we can envision a similar identication strategy
as in Section 4.2. This suggests that we could test the validity of the contract terms from the rst-order
306 Identication Strategies for Case 4
From Section 4.2, any assumption that identies H2(X;Z) will identify the structure
[F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)] on (X;Z)  A(X;Z) and [dd2(X;Z);d(X;Z)], respectively. In
this section, we investigate some identifying assumptions/conditions for H2(X;Z). An-
other possibility is to derive some bounds for H2(X;Z).
Parameterization of H(jX;Z)
A simple stategy to identify H2(X;Z) is to parameterize the damage distribution
H(jX;Z) as H(jX;Z;) on [0;d(X;Z)] with  2    IR
q. Observations on reported
damage D will typically identify  and hence H(jX;Z) on [0;d(X;Z)]. In particular,
H2(X;Z) = H(dd2(X;Z)jX;Z;) will be identied. So far, we have tried to minimize
parametric assumptions. From an estimation point of view, one could estimate non-
parametrically the truncated damage conditional density and use its shape to choose the
parameterization of H(jX;Z). This exercise would require some reasonable assumptions
on the damage distribution such as continuity on its support and no mass point below
dd2(X;Z).
Additional Data Sources
A second strategy is to consider additional data sources providing for instance the
average number of accidents (reported and unreported) for every (x;z) 2 SXZ, i.e.
(x;z) = E[jX = x;Z = z]. Let the average number of reported accidents for every
(x;z) be 
c(x;z) = E(j = c;X = x;Z = z)(1   Hc(X;Z)) for c = 1;2. We have













leading to the identication of H2(x;z) given that c(x;z), 
c(x;z);c = 1;2 and (x;z) are
identied from the data as shown in Section 4.2. Alternatively, an auxiliary information
could be E(j = c;X = x;Z = z) for (say) c = 2 and every (x;z). From the knowledge
of 
2(x;z), it is straightforward to identify H2(x;z).
conditions (5)-(6) even when a continuum of coverages is oered albeit an assumption similar to Assump-
tion 2 has to be made.
31Next, we consider that an auxiliary information is E[jX = x0;Z = z0] for some
(x0;z0). Using the argument in the previous paragraph shows that H2(x0;z0) is identied.
This information combined with a support assumption such as (x;z) =  for every
(x;z) identies H2(x;z). Specically, note that we have ~ (x;z) = (1   H2(x;z))(x;z),
where ~ (x;z) is the upper boundary of the support of f~ jX;Z(jX = x;Z = z), which
is identied as shown in Section 4.2. Applying this equation at (x0;z0) identies  by
~ (x0;z0)=(1 H2(x0;z0)). Applying again this equation at dierent values (x;z) identies
H2(x;z). A similar argument applies if (x;z) = .
It remains to investigate whether additional information on damages (reported and
unreported) helps in identifying H2(x;z). We have
E(DjX = x;Z = z) = E[DjD  dd2(x;z)jX = x;z = z]H2(x;z)
+E[DjD  dd2(x;z)jX = x;z = z](1   H2(x;z));
where E[DjD  dd2(x;z);X = x;z = z] =
R d(x;z)
dd2(x;z) Dh
2(DjX = x;Z = z)dD is identied
from the data. Thus, for every (x;z) it is straightforward to see that identication of
H2(x;z) requires to know both E[DjD  dd2(x;z);X = x;Z = z] and E(DjX = x;Z =
z). In particular, the knowledge of the latter is not sucient in constrast to the previous
case in which additional data on the average number of accidents only was sucient
for identication. As above, if one knows E[DjD  dd2(x0;z0);X = x0;Z = z0] and
E(DjX = x0;Z = z0) for some (x0;z0) and if either (x;z) or (x;z) is independent of
(x;z), then H2(x;z) is identied for every (x;z).
Set Identification
A third strategy is to derive some bounds on H2(X;Z), which will provide some
bounds on the structure [F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z). This approach also known as set iden-
tication has been made popular by Manski and Tamer (2002) and Chernozhukov, Hong
and Tamer (2007). See also Haile and Tamer (2003) and Kovchegov and Yildiz (2009) for
nonparametric bounds. Our bounds are in the spirit of the latter as they are nonpara-
metric. Let [F 0(;jX;Z);H0(jX;Z)] be the true structure. Given an arbitrary pair of
values (x;z), Proposition 4 implies that it is sucient to determine the identied set for
32H0
2(x;z), i.e. the set of values H2(x;z) that are observationally equivalent to H0
2(x;z).15
The proof of Lemma 3 shows that any value H2(x;z) = 1   (1=)[1   H0
2(x;z)] for
 > sup(~ x;~ z)[1   H0
2(~ x; ~ z)] is observationally equivalent to H0
2(x;z). Thus, the identied
set for H0





sup(~ x;~ z)[1   H0




For the values (x;z) for which 1   H0
2(x;z) is close to the supremum, the left boundary
of the above interval approaches zero. Hence, for those values, the identied set is close
to (0;1), which is not informative.
Some empirical evidence in Cohen and Einav (2007) may help us to motivate an
additional assumption that renders these bounds tighter. In particular, their estimated
damage density strictly decreases when the damage approaches the deductible from above
suggesting that the density below the deductible is not greater than its value at the
deductible. We then make the following assumption.
Assumption 3:The conditional damage distribution H(jX;Z) satises
h(Djx;z)  h[dd2(x;z)jx;z];
for every D  dd2(x;z) and (x;z) 2 SXZ.
We use this assumption to construct more informative bounds. Specically, integrating
both sides from 0 to dd2(x;z) we obtain 0  H2(x;z)  dd2(x;z)h(dd2(x;z)jx;z). Divid-









Solving for H2(x;z) gives the bounds






15To be precise, this is the set of values H2(x;z) corresponding to structures [F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)]
that are observationally equivalent to [F0(;jX;Z);H0(jX;Z)].
33In particular, the upper bound for H2(x;z) is strictly less than 1. Moreover, a useful
feature of the bounds (27) is that they are expressed as functions of observables.16
It remains to derive some bounds on the structure [F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)]. From (19)





2(jx;z) + B(x;z)(1   H

2(jx;z))]
for every   dd2(x;z) and (x;z) 2 SXZ. Thus, the smaller is B(x;z), i.e. the smaller is
dd2(x;z)h
2(dd2(x;z)jx;z), the narrower is the above interval.
Regarding the derivation of bounds on F(;jX;Z), we follow the identication ar-
gument of Section 4.2. We rst derive bounds for the marginal c.d.f of  given (X;Z).
Recall that the c.d.f. of ~  = (1   H2(x;z)) is identied from its moment generat-
ing function and the observed number of reported accidents. In particular, we have
FjX;Z(jx;z) = ~ F~ jX;Z[(1   H2(x;z))  jx;z] showing that
~ F~ jX;Z[(1   B(x;z))  jx;z]  FjX;Z(jx;z)  ~ F~ jX;Z(jx;z);
leading to a rst-order stochastic dominance among these three c.d.f.s. Section 4.2 does
not provide, however, an explicit expression for the c.d.f. ~ F~ jX;Z(jx;z) as its identication
was established through its moment generating function (19).
To obtain such an explicit form, we consider its density ~ f~ jX;Z(jx;z) and determines
its characteristic function ~ jX;Z(jx;z) from available data. We rst remark that the
distribution of ~  given (;X;Z) has compact support. Thus, it has an entire characteristic
function ~ j;X;Z(jc;x;z), i.e. a characteristic function that has a (unique) dierentiable
extension on the whole set of complex numbers ~ j;X;Z(jc;x;z) = E[ei~ j = c;X =
16To show that the bounds (27) are sharp requires to obtain the set of observationally equivalent
values H2(x;z), and in particular, the sharp lower bound of this set. The previous discussion shows that
the latter is between 0 and the lower bound of the interval (26). Similarly, exploiting the relationship
1   H2(x;z) = [1   H1(x;z)]=(x;z) we obtain bounds for H1(x;z), namely





The lower and upper bounds for H1(x;z) are strictly larger than zero and smaller than one, respectively.
34x;Z = z] for  2 1 C. See Lukacs (1960, p. 139). Following the derivation leading to (16)
with t replaced by i and noting that the characteristic function of a Binomial B(n;p)
and a Poisson P() random variables are entire with extensions equal to (1   p + pei)n

















where the second equality follows from ~  = (1 H2(X;Z)). Let ~  = [(1 Hc(x;z))(ei  
1)]=[i(1   H2(x;z))], for all  2 1 C and  = u + ilog(cosu) for u 2 ( =2;=2). Then,
~  = tanu when c = 2 and ~  = (x;z)tanu when c = 1. Moreover, the range of ~  is IR.
Therefore, letting t = arctanu when c = 2 and t = (x;z)arctanu when c = 1 in (28),
and using cos(arctant) = 1=
p
1 + t2 give the characteristic functions



























for all t 2 IR. Since ~ jX;Z(tjx;z) = 1(x;z)~ j;X;Z(tj1;x;z) + 2(x;z)~ j;X;Z(tj2;x;z),
one obtains the density ~ f~ jX;Z(j;) by the inverse Fourier transform







if ~ jX;Z(jx;z) is absolutely integrable, in which case ~ fjX;Z(~ jx;z) is continuous. See e.g.
Billingsley (1995, pp.347-348). Lastly, to determine the identied set for Faj;X(j;), one
can use the bounds for H2(X;Z) and follow the identifying argument of Section 4.2.
7 Conclusion
Our paper addresses the problem of identication of insurance models with multidimen-
sional screening, where insurees have private information on their risk and risk aversion,
each taking a continuum of values. We dene risk as the expected number of accidents.
35We make a special eort to incorporate in our model some important features in insurance
such as a random damage and the possibility of several accidents. The model also consid-
ers the possibility that the contracts oered to each insuree is either a continuum or nite
in number. Moreover, we also allow for data restrictions on the number of accidents and
their corresponding damages as insurees are expected to report an accident only when the
damage is above the deductible. Bunching arises necessarily at the equilibrium because of
mutlidimensional private information. The bunching problem is accentuated when there
is a nite number of coverages. Consequently, insurees with dierent private information
can choose the same coverage, which complicates the problem of identication from cov-
erage choices. Despite this, we show that we identify the joint distribution of risk and
risk aversion. When a continuum of contracts is oered, identication is achieved with-
out any additional assumption by exploiting the number of (reported) accidents. When
a nite number of contracts is oered, this information also plays a crucial role though
additional identifying assumptions need to be made. When only reported accidents and
damages are available to the analyst, we provide several identifying strategies including
set identication. Lastly, we characterize all the restrictions imposed by the model on ob-
servables. Such restrictions can be used to test the model validity. An interesting feature
of these restrictions is that optimality of the oered coverages can be tested separately as
identication of the model does not rely on this property.
Our results can readily be used to analyze insurance data when a limited number of
coverages is oered to each insuree and accidents are reported only when the damage is
above the deductible. The estimation method can follow the identication steps. Section
6 provides the material needed to estimate nonparametrically the model. For instance,
one could use nonparametric density estimators to obtain estimates of the bounds for the
probability of damage below the deductible. Inverse Fourier transform of the empirical
characteristic function can then be used to estimate bounds on the marginal distribution
of risk. Our nonparametric approach leaves much exibility on the degree of dependence
between risk and risk aversion. Our companion paper develops this estimation procedure
with an application to automobile insurance data. See Aryal, Perrigne and Vuong (in
36progress).
Our model allows the individual and car characteristics to be dependent. This can be
exploited further by endogeneizing the car choice given the individual's characteristics,
risk and risk aversion. This would lead to a model explaining the car choice, the coverage
choice, the number of accidents and the damages. Our results still hold in this case. In
particular, the identication of the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion can help
in estimating and/or simulating this model. See Aryal and Perrigne (in progress). More
generally, our results can be used to analyze a large range of insurance data such as
crop, health or home insurance as long as the data provide a repeated outcome such
as several claims made by insurees. Our identication method can also be used to study
identication of models with adverse selection when a nite number of contracts is oered.
One can think of nonlinear pricing where a nite number of price/quantity options is
oered to consumers or rms who purchase items several times over the pricing period.
37Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3: In view of Proposition 4, H2(X;Z) is identied if and only if the struc-
ture [F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)] is. Thus, it suces to show that the latter is not identied. Let
[F(;jX;Z);H(jX;Z)] be a structure satisfying Denitions 1 and 2 as well as Assumptions 1
and 2. We construct a second structure [ ~ F(;jX;Z); ~ H(jX; Z)] as follows. Let ~  =  with
 > sup(x;z)2SXZ[1   H2(x;z)]  0, while ~ a = a so that ~ f(;jX;Z) = (1=)f(=;jX;Z). Let
~ h(jX;Z) be a strictly positive conditional density on its support [0;d(X;Z)] with ~ h(DjX;Z) =
(1=)h(DjX;Z) for D  dd2(X;Z). Because 0 <
R d(x;z)
dd2(x;z)
~ h(Djx;z)dD < 1, it follows that  >
1 H2(x;z) for all (x;z) 2 SXZ as required above. The second structure [ ~ F(;jX;Z); ~ H(jX;Z)]
satises Denitions 1 and 2 as well as Assumptions 1 and 2 as ~ (a;X;Z) = (a;X;Z) as shown
below.
We now show that these two structures are observationally equivalent, i.e. they lead to the
same distribution for the observables (J;D
1;:::;D
J;;t1;dd1;t2;dd2) given (X;Z), where J
and D refer to the number of reported accidents and their corresponding damages, respectively,
while  indicates which coverage is chosen by the insuree. First, we note that the coverage terms
are deterministic functions of (X;Z) solving the FOC (8){(12). Thus, the optimal frontier for











thereby showing that the highest risk aversion in ~ A1 is ~ a(X;Z) = a(X;Z).
Regarding the distribution ~  given (X;Z), we note that ~  = . The latter follows from ~  = 1
if and only if (~ ;a) 2 ~ A1(X;Z), i.e. ~   ~ (a;X;Z) and a(X;Z)  a  ~ a(X;Z). Since ~  = ,
~ (a;X;Z) = (a;X;Z) and ~ a(X;Z) = a(X;Z), we have ~  = 1 if and only if  = 1. Thus,
the distribution of ~  given (X;Z) is the same as that of  given (X;Z), i.e. ~ c(X;Z) = c(X;Z)
for c = 1;2. Regarding the distribution of ~ J given (~ ;X;Z) = (;X;Z), from (16) its moment
generating function is
M~ j;X;Z[(1   ~ H(X;Z))(et   1)jc;x;z] = Mj;X;Z[(1   H(X;Z))(et   1)jc;x;z]
= MJj;X;Z[tjc;x;z]
38using 1   ~ Hc(X;Z) = (1   Hc(X;Z))= and M~ j;X;Z(ujc;x;z) = Mj;X;Z(ujc;x;z). Hence,
the distribution of ~ J given (;X;Z) is the same as that of J given (;X;Z). Regarding the
distribution of reported damage ~ D given ( ~ J;;X;Z) is
~ H
(jX;Z) =
~ H(jX;Z)   ~ H(X;Z)






using 1   ~ H(jX;Z) = (1   H(jX;Z))=.
Lastly, it remains to show that (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z);t2(X;Z);dd2(X;Z)) satises the FOC
(8){(12) associated with the second structure. Using ~ (a;X;Z) = (a;X;Z), ~ f(~ (a;X;Z);ajX;
Z) = f(~ (a;X;Z)=;ajX;Z)= = f((a;X;Z);ajX;Z)=, 1  ~ H(DjX;Z) = (1 H(DjX;Z))=,
~ c = c and E[~ j ~ Ac] = E[jAc], it can be easily veried that (t1(X;Z);dd1(X;Z);t2(X;Z);dd2
(X;Z)) satises (8){(12) with ~  =  as soon as (8){(12) hold for the original structure. Hence,
the two structures lead to the same distributions for the observables as desired.2
Proof of Lemma 4: We rst prove neccessity. Let [F(;j;);H(j;)] 2 FXZ  HXZ be a
structure that rationalizes 	(;:::;) under Assumptions 1 and 2. To prove (i) we follow Guerre,
Perrigne and Vuong (2000) proof of Theorem 4 (Conditions C1-C2). From Assumption 1-(i,ii),
we have (D1;:::;DJ) i.i.d as H(jX;Z) conditional upon (J;;a;X;Z). Thus, J follows a
B[J;1 H(X;Z)] given (J;;a;X;Z) since an accident is reported if and only if the damage is

























because (D1;:::;DJ) are i.i.d. as H(jX;Z) given (J;;a;X;Z). Since J is B[J;1 H(X;Z)]
given (J;;a;X;Z) we obtain
Pr[D
1  d1;:::;D







j) are i.i.d as H
(X;Z) 2 H
XZ given (J = j;J;;a;X;Z) and hence
given (J = j;;X;Z). Thus, (i) holds.
39To prove (ii), we note that 	Dj;X;Z(j;;) = H
(;) 2 H
XZ thereby establishing the rst
part of (ii). Moreover,  Dj;X;Z(dj2;x;z)= Dj;X;Z(dj1;x;z) = (1 H1(x;z))=(1 H2(x;z)) 
(x;z), which is independent of d 2 [dd1(x;z);d(x;z)] and in (0;1).
To prove (iii), we note that
Pr[J = jj;a;X;Z] =
1 X
j=j
Pr[J = jjJ = j;;a;X;Z]Pr[J = jj;a;X;Z]:
Thus, J given (;a;X;Z) is a mixture of a B[J;1   H(X;Z)] with a mixing P() distri-
bution by Assumption 1-(iii). That is, 	Jj;a;X;Z(j;a;x;z) is a P[(1   H(x;z))] distribu-
tion. Hence,  Jj;X;Z(jc;x;z) =
R
Ac 	Jj;a;X;Z(j;a;x;z)dF(;ajx;z) thereby establishing
 Jj;X;Z(jc;x;z) > 0 on I N as F(;j;) 2 FXZ. The moment generating function of J
given (;X;Z) exists on IR in view of (16) since the distribution of  given (;X;Z) has a
bounded support. The right-hand sides of (18) must be the moment generating functions of
absolutely continuous distributions with densities bounded away from zero on their supports
[~ (1;x;z);~ (1;x;z)] and [~ (2;x;z);~ (2;x;z)] with union equal to [~ (1;x;z);~ (2;x;z)] included
in IR++ because they are the moment generating functions of ~  = (1 H2(X;Z)) given (c;x;z)
which have such properties.
Regarding (iv), for every (;a;x) 2 SaX, we have





~ f~ j;X;Z(~ j1;x;z) jx;z(1jx;z)
~ f~ jX;Z(~ jx;z)
;
for some z 2 SZjx, where the rst equality follows from Assumption 2, the second equality from
Bayes rule, and the third equality from ~  = (1 H2(X;Z)). Because a can be chosen arbitrarily,
it follows that the right-hand side takes all values in [0;1]. Regarding (v), let ~  = (1 H2(X;Z)).
The proof then follows the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 3 with  = 1   H2(X;Z).
We now turn to suciency. Let the distribution 	(;:::;) of (J;D
1;:::;D
J;;X;Z;)
and the contract terms [t1(;);dd1(;);t2(;);dd2(;)] satisfy (i){(v). We need to exhibit
a structure [F(;j;);H(j;)] 2 FXZ  HXZ satisfying Assumptions 1{2 that rationalizes
	(;:::;) of (J;D
1;:::;D
J;;X;Z;) and [t1(;);dd1(;);t2(;);dd2(;)]. Let the distribu-
tion of (J;D1;:::;DJ;;a;X;Z) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2-(i).
In view of the identication argument of Section 4.2, we dene H(j;) as follows: For a con-
stant  2 (0;1), let H(DjX;Z) =  Dj;X;Z(Dj2;X;Z)+(1 ) when D  dd2(X;Z). Note that
40H(jX;Z) has a strictly positive density on [dd2(X;Z);d(X;Z)] because 	Dj;X;Z(j2;X;Z) 2
H
2XZ. For D 2 [0;dd2(X;Z)] let H(jX;Z) be arbitrary as long as it has a strictly posi-
tive density on [0;dd2(X;Z)]. Thus, H(j;) 2 HX;Z. Note that  = 1   H(dd2(X;Z)jX;Z) 
1 H2(X;Z) so that H
2(jX;Z)  [H(jX;Z) H2(X;Z)]=[1 H2(X;Z)] = 	Dj;X;Z(j2;X;Z)
after straightforward algebra. Moreover,  Dj;X;Z(Dj2;X;Z) = (X;Z)  Dj;X;Z(Dj1;X;Z)
for D  dd1(X;Z) by (ii) implying (X;Z) = 1   	Dj;X;Z[dd1(X;Z)j2;X;Z] by integration
and H
1(jX;Z)  [H(jX;Z) H1(X;Z)]=[1 H1(X;Z)] = 	DjXZ(j1;X;Z) after some alge-
bra. Thus, 	D
1;:::;D
JjJ;;X;Z(;:::;j;:::;) is rationalized given Assumption 1 as long as  is
a deterministic function of (;a;X;Z) as implied by the theoretical model.
To construct F(;j;) we follow again the identication argument. Let f(jc;X;Z) =
 ~ f~ j;X;Z(jc;X;Z) and f(jX;Z) =  ~ f~ jX;Z(jX;Z), where these densities exist by condition
(iii). In particular, f(jX;Z) is strictly positive on its support [~ (1;x;z)=;~ (2;x;z)=]  IR++.
Turning to Faj;X;Z(j;;) = Faj;X(j;) by Assumption 2-(i), we follow (21). For every
(;x) 2 SX, let Faj;X(jx;z) have a strictly positive density on its support Saj~ x  fa : 9z 2
SZj~ x;a = ~ a(~ ;x;z)g = Sajx  fa : 9z 2 SZjx;a = a(;x;z)g satisfying
Faj;X[a(;x;z)j;x] =
~ f~ j;X;Z(~ j1;x;z) (1jx;z)
~ f~ jX;Z(~ jx;z)
(A.1)
for every (;x;z) 2 SXZ, where ~  =  and a(;x;z)  ~ a(;x;z). By (iv) the right-hand
side has range [0;1] as z varies in SZj~ x for every given (~ ;x) 2 S~ X, i.e. for every given
(;x) 2 SX. Thus, for every (;x) 2 SX and every a 2 Sajx, there exists a z 2 SZ such that
a = a(;x;z), i.e. Assumption 2-(ii) is satised. We can now extend Faj;X(j;x) over Sajx
by Faj;X(aj;x) = Faj;X[a(;x;z)j;x] using the above equation. Thus, F(;j;) 2 FXZ as
desired.
The structure [F(;j;);H(j;)] constructed as above rationalizes 	Jj;X;Z(j;;) be-
cause of (18) and the uniqueness of the corresponding density. This structure also rationalizes





~ f~ j;X;Z(~ j1;x;z)1(x;z)
~ f~ jX;Z(~ jx;z)
:
Using (A.1) shows that 1(x;z) =  jX;Z(1jx;z) as desired. The fact that the structure ratio-
nalizes (t1(;);dd1(;);t2(;);dd2(;)) follows the argument of the last paragraph of the proof
of Lemma 3. 2
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